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Institutions as Knowledge Capital:  




The paper revisits the socioeconomic theory of the Austrian School 
economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the common claim that 
Lachmann’s idiosyncratic (read: eclectic and multidisciplinary) approach to 
economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reaches the following 
conclusions.  (1) Lachmann held a sophisticated institutional position to 
economics that anticipated developments in contemporary new 
institutional economics.  (2) Lachmann’s sociological and economic reading 
of institutions offers insights for the problem of coordination.  (3) Lachmann 
extends contemporary new institutional theory without simultaneously 




Comparative institutional analysis, coordination, expectations, institutional 
evolution, interpretative institutionalism. 
 
JEL Codes 




To this day, the principal substantive socioeconomic contribution of the Austrian 
School economist Ludwig M. Lachmann (1 February 1906 – 17 December 1990) 
remains to many ambiguous at best.1 Aside from perhaps a few specialists, those 
who are aware of Lachmann’s work seem to have difficulties with it and in the main 
consider it as a minor disturbance in the otherwise smooth development of the 
theoretical trajectory of modern economics from Arrow and Debreu (1954).  Langlois 
(1986a: 171) synthesises this dominant conception of Lachmann’s contribution well 
when he writes that  
Lachmann [was] the scourge of determinism, the apostle of 
disequilibrium, the prophet of the kaleidic.  Thus, in many, if not most, 
eyes, [his] role appeared as that of gadfly – or, at best, of 
methodological conscience – to his fellow theorists. His [was] the 
salutary albeit annoying task of reminding us that the future is 
unknowable, that expectations must diverge, and that there are forces 
of discoordination as well as of coordination.2 
  Lachmann was indeed an economist who insisted that capital was essentially a 
subjective (rather than physical) category and therefore could not be aggregated and 
measured; who promoted a radical subjectivism derived from post-Keynesian 
economist George Shackle (1972); who fused this radical subjectivism with the thoughts 
of interpretative sociologist Alfred Schütz and the German interpretative movement in 
philosophy and sociology, and who introduced Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology to 
economics discourse. What is more, that same – purportedly Austrian – economist 
thought approvingly of John Maynard Keynes and Paul Davidson, especially because 
of their critiques of equilibrium theory (Lachmann, 1971, 1978[1956], 1986).  What does 
one do with such a type? 
  Usually, such types are christened “idiosyncratic” or even “nihilistic”. Clearly, 
Lachmann was idiosyncratic if by that is meant that he stayed far away from the 
mainstream in economics,3 borrowed ideas from other disciplines (notably sociology), 
                                                 
1   For overviews of Lachmann’s life and work see, e.g., Grinder’s “Introduction” to Lachmann (1977a), 
Mittermaier (1992), Boettke (1994), Lavoie in Lavoie (1994: 1-19), Vaughn (1994: chapter 7), Koppl and 
Mongiovi (1995), and Laurence Moss (2004); an online Lachmann biography penned by one of his 
students – Peter Lewin – is available at http://www.mises.org/content/Lachmann.asp 
2   Quoting Shackle (1972: 76), Lachmann often uses the metaphor of the kaleidoscope in juxtaposition to 
that of the clock. For example: the “kaleidic society [intersperses] its moments or intervals of order, 
assurance and beauty with sudden disintegration and a cascade into a new pattern” (Lachmann 1986: 
48).  The Appendix to Lachmann (1986: 157-65), which essentially discusses Keynes’s subjectivism, is 
the English translation of an article originally published in 1984 in German entitled “The Market is not a 
Clockwork.”  For some context on the matter, see Garrison (1987). 
3   Of course, what was the ”mainstream” in Lachmann’s times may not be today’s.  See Colander, Holt 
and Rosser (2004), which claims that today’s mainstream is no longer orthodox.  
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and used these to develop his own approach to subjectivist economics.  We can all 
agree that he was idiosyncratic in this sense. But, as we argue in this paper, Lachmann 
was no nihilist. In this regard, let us flag at the outset that in the context of discussing 
and criticizing Lachmann’s ideas the term “nihilist” refers to Lachmann’s scepticism as 
to whether the market system is inherently  equilibrating; not to the more familiar 
denotation of a person who denies that any prescriptive ethics is possible and desirable. 
As such, Lachmann’s position stands against a central tenet of the Austrian School of 
economics, as perhaps most meticulously expounded by Kirzner (1973).4 
  Critics thus argued that Lachmann’s insistence that, since future actions are 
based on future knowledge and since future knowledge cannot be had beforehand, the 
future is inherently unpredictable, is tantamount to negating the possibility for rational, 
future-oriented action.  That is to say, within Lachmann’s theoretical system it would be 
impossible, the critics asserted, for rational decisions to be made.  Social interactions 
would display no systematic tendencies, no causal laws − no order, in short.5 
  Now, one may retort that the existence of genuine uncertainty does not at all 
mean that we are somehow cut off from analyzing the emergence of ordered states.6  
Indeed, at least since Alchian (1950) we have known that we can also rely on 
evolutionary forces as the relevant order-producing forces (cf. also Langlois and Koppl, 
1991). However, there is a limit to how much we can do this – some measure of 
rationality has to be claimed for any tendency towards equilibrium to exist. Thus, there 
must be some agents who react in a rational (which is not to say perfect) way to relative 
price signals and arbitrage opportunities, as Kirzner (1962) clarified. Cutting the basis 
for rational action completely away would mean chaos.  That much is certain; but was it 
what Lachmann argued in favour of? 
  It cannot be denied that Lachmann flirted with what the majority of 
contemporary economists, including Austrian economists, would regard as rather 
extreme ideas (e.g., Lachmann, 1976).  However, the reason Lachmann is no nihilist 
is because he “anchors” knowledge and expectations in institutions, that is, in the 
conventions, mores, norms, laws, etc. of society.  More precisely, Lachmann explains 
how it is our stylized conceptions of each other and of social phenomena – which in 
time become anchored in institutions – that simplify our action in society (Schütz, 
1972[1932]; Lachmann, 1971). His overall aim can thus be described as the wish to 
build an institutional economics that is grounded in the Verstehende Sociozologie 
(sociology of understanding) of Max Weber and Alfred Schütz – an interpretative 
institutionalism, as it were (Lachmann, e.g., 1971, 1977b[1966], 1991).7 
                                                 
4    For example:  Lachmann’s “colleagues and friends [at New York University] did apparently (and 
presumably in good spirit) dub him a nihilist.  But while he liked the label Radical Subjectivist, he did not 
consider himself to be a nihilist.  There was another [namely, a historical and institutional] dimension to 
his intellect which gave him a quite different perspective on the question of what economists should 
do” (Mittermaier 1992: 18; original emphasis). 
5   Cf. Lavoie in Lavoie (1994: 1-2). 
6   Cf. Langlois (1986a). 
7   In an important recent contribution, Koppl (2002: 8) identifies the central “Lachmann problem” as “the 
need for a theory of expectations in which each person’s actions are animated by the spontaneous 
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  We shall argue that this interpretative institutionalism is Lachmann’s important 
contribution. To do so, we will try to free Lachmann of the charge of nihilism by 
arguing that he developed a perspective on institutions and on how institutions assist 
action in society through time. This institutional perspective – though within the 
Austrian tradition and with some affinities with new institutional economics – in 
important ways must be considered a distinctive approach.8 It is precisely by pointing 
to the presence of institutions in Lachmann’s thinking that we will be able to free him of 
the above charges, for institutions stabilize the social landscape by stabilizing actions 
and expectations.  Hence, there is not necessarily an inconsistency in Lachmann’s 
thinking:  it is possible to be sceptical as to whether the market process is everywhere 
and always equilibrating, and at the same time argue that there is order on account of 
the role of institutions as stabilizing factors. 
  Our search for what we consider to be the essence of Lachmann’s thought is 
therefore not merely motivated by doctrinal concerns, but by theoretical ones as well. 
As we shall additionally see, to Lachmann institutions are ultimately that 
intersubjectively and intertemporally understood knowledge  capital t h a t  a l l o w s  u s  t o  
coordinate, align or orient our actions, expectations or plans with some measure of 
success. Indeed, Lachmann also informs us that all agents ascertain the meaning of 
institutions, that is, that they hold (sometimes even unconsciously) a mental model of 
how a particular institution works (or not). 
 
2.  Knowledge and Expectations 
 
For Lachmann, as for most economists, the essential feature of economics is the 
exploration of purposeful action and the examination of the consequences of the 
interaction of multiple acting individuals. The mainstream economist will not 
necessarily disagree; but mainstream economics adopts it own conception of what 
“purposeful action” and “interaction of multiple acting individuals” mean.  Thus, the 
meaning of the first phrase is captured by postulating utility maximizing behaviour 
(which also underlies profit maximizing behaviour); the second meaning is captured by 
claiming that social interaction – the aggregation of behaviours – can be represented in 
terms of equilibrium.  In much of mainstream economics, the two levels of analysis, that 
of the individual and that of interaction, are conflated by focusing attention on a 
representative agent.9 
                                                                                                                                                        
activity of a free human mind”. Koppl’s analysis is very much congruent with our own. But whereas 
Koppl focuses on both coordination (the role of institutions) and discoordination (disruptions by so-
called Big Players), we mostly focus on coordination. 
8   By new institutional economics we have in mind the body of modern literature that uses economic tools to 
analyze real-world institutions by means of the method of comparative institutional analysis, such as Coase 
(1960), North (1981), Williamson (1985), Langlois (1986a,b, 1992), and Eggertsson (1990). 
9   In situations of interaction (think, e.g., about principal-agent analysis) the problem is (as hinted) in 
actual fact no different, for the parties involved are postulated to share many of the important 
attributes, e.g., share the random variable and the density function of the probability distribution.   
Identically to its profit maximizing counterpart, there is a loss of genuine population thinking: one 
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  To the Austrian economist, this standard analytical procedure is, at best, 
limiting, since it effectively suppresses many, perhaps most, interesting economic 
problems, not the least all sorts of coordination problems. And it is in fact hard to think 
of any economist as far removed from the representative agent methodology as 
Lachmann (e.g., 1986: chs 2 and 3). To Lachmann, understanding the meaning of 
“purposeful behaviour” must involve thinking in a sophisticated way about thought 
processes, about the interpretations of agents, about how individual knowledge grows 
and changes, etc. And doing this must surely lead to a complete rejection of extreme 
representative agent methodology, for it cannot but lead us to the recognition that 
diversity in terms of the knowledge people hold, how the process of knowledge 
acquisition take place, etc. is a crucial feature of the economic landscape. 
  Indeed, if taken seriously, the doctrine of methodological individualism leads to 
a thoroughgoing subjectivist position (cf. Langlois, 1986d). And as Lachmann was 
furthermore eager to emphasize, a thoroughgoing subjectivist position is rather 
naturally correlated with an interpretive method. In fact, he argued that “the main 
contribution the Austrians made to the ‘subjective’ revolution of the 1870s ... [lies] ... in 
the ‘interpretative turn’ ... [that] they managed to impart to the evolution of economic 
thought at that critical period” (Lachmann, 1991: 277). 
  Though methodological individualists, mainstream economists have not 
followed the subjectivist and interpretative implications of the individualist stance.   
Moreover, the representative agents are cognitive supermen, being able to solve 
maximization problems with a Lagrangian the size of a phone directory. All this is 
defended, of course, by an Ockham’s razor argument:  by pointing to the useful 
predictions that these “simplifying assumptions” allow.10 To Lachmann (e.g., 1986: ch. 
2), however, these are not “simplifications,” but gross distortions. As a result, the 
portrayal of human action11 to be found in mainstream economics represents a too 
serious affront to realism.12 
  Lachmann additionally asserts that “… time and knowledge belong together. 
As soon as we permit time to elapse, we must permit knowledge to change. The 
pattern of knowledge never stands still” (Lachmann, 1978[1956]: 3).13  Mainstream 
economics actually telescopes this time-knowledge problem that Lachmann sees as 
central: in practice, it lets time elapse without allowing knowledge to change.  This is 
                                                                                                                                                        
assumes agents having the same characteristics and then sums these characteristics up to obtain the 
representative agent; rather than assume agents with different characteristics and build up from that. 
See for example the Marshallian population thinking versus Pigovian representative firm thinking 
discussion of industry composition in Moss (1984) and O’Brien (1984). 
10   A legacy that is arguably traceable to the famous “F-twist” by Milton Friedman:  the belief that one should 
not worry about a theory’s assumptions, but about its predictable conclusions. Lachmann’s critique of 
such instrumentalist method is in Lachmann (1971: 27 and 35). 
11   In fact, Lachmann follows Shackle in thinking that “human re-action” would be a more fitting expression for 
economic action as portrayed by the mainstream.  See for example Lachmann (1973: 19). 
12   Philosophers would call Lachmann a representational realist:  it “does matter which features of reality we 
accentuate in our schemes, and which we abstract from” (Lachmann, 1986: 42). 
13   In more than one contribution, Lewin (e.g., 1994: 239) refers to this as “Lachmann’s axiom.”  
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what lies at the heart of the search for predictability, of single exit reasoning.  But 
predictability is inherently problematic, since predicting individual actions and/or 
future aggregate states would imply predicting the knowledge on which actions are 
based.  And it is a well-known epistemological impossibility theorem that future 
knowledge cannot be foreseen (in details); if it could, it would cease to be future 
knowledge and would turn into present knowledge.14 
  Lachmann also rejects mainstream attempts to actually model changing 
knowledge with the argument that if “we were to include the state of knowledge in 
our model ... [w]e should have to introduce it either as a datum or as a dependent 
variable ... to treat it as a dependent variable would mean to treat processes of 
thought as though they were predictable” (Lachmann, 1986: 28).  No two minds 
acquire and process knowledge in the same way (Op. cit.: ch. 3).  
  But do differences in individual learning also imply that individual expectations 
will also always differ? Not necessarily, answers Lachmann (1976: 59):   
 
The future is unknowable, though not unimaginable. Future knowledge 
cannot be had now, but it can cast its shadow ahead. In each mind, 
however, the shadow assumes a different shape, hence the divergence of 
expectations. The formation of expectations is an act of our mind by 
means of which we try to catch a glimpse of the unknown.  Each one of us 
catches a different glimpse. The wider the range of divergence the greater 
the possibility that somebody’s expectation will turn out to be right.”  
 
Notice how Lachmann’s message in this passage is far from being nihilistic.  Although 
future knowledge cannot be obtained, expectations in the sense of reasoned conjectures 
are still possible. Thus, individual rationality in the general sense of having reasoned 
expectations and motives for behaviour and acting on these is possible notwithstanding 
a radically subjectivist position. What is perhaps more interesting is that the passage 
reveals that systemic rationality is also a possible substitute for individual rationality, 
because there is an allusion to an innate evolutionary mechanism that sorts among 
divergent expectations (“The wider the range...”).15 The passage thus shows that it is 
incorrect to assert that Lachmann propounded the view that action is random, or 
whimsical at best, and that there are no possible social regularities. 
  This notwithstanding, what many commentators have taken  from Lachmann’s 
thinking are not these more positive facets as rather the devastating effects for most of 
mainstream economics if his ideas were suddenly to be taken seriously. That is to say, 
                                                 
14    As Knight synthesized it, the “existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the future being 
different from the past, while the possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being 
like the past” (Knight, 1946[1921]: 313). Another locus classicus of the notion that we cannot anticipate 
future knowledge is the work of Karl Popper. In general, compare O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985). 
15    An evolutionary reasoning per se puts into question any “F-twist” reasoning, for it questions the 
assumption that survival in any landscape must necessarily imply maximizing behaviour in every point in 
time – see the classic contribution by Winter (1964).  
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the critiques were often rooted in the sociology of the profession, for reasons of self-
preservation of the status quo of the discipline, and not necessarily for inherent fallacy of 
argument.16 It should then not be too surprising that Lachmann was by many placed in 
the “nihilist” category. 
 But  does Lachmann ultimately truly paint himself into a corner?  Or does 
Lachmann actually try to offer a concrete alternative to mainstream economics?  It may 
very well be, in our view, that Lachmann has not attacked and demolished a well-
established theory of the order-producing properties of markets:  Lachmann tried to 
stimulate the development of a different approach. 
 
3.  Lachmann, Interpretation, and Institutions 
 
To our knowledge, Lachmann was not aware of modern developments in new 
institutional economics.17 However, he presents a quite acute critique of the treatment 
of institutions in mainstream economics that is in on an overall level akin to that 
presented by modern new institutionalist scholars, such as North (1981), Williamson 
(1985), and Langlois (1986a,c,d; 1992).  Of course, there are differences, because the new 
institutionalists mainly emphasize the incentive aspect of institutions (e.g., North, 1990), 
whereas Lachmann emphasized the cognition dimension of institutions. Moreover, 
while new institutionalist scholars have usually subscribed to single-exit modelling of 
agents, Lachmann’s thought is at variance with this approach.18 
  The objective of new institutional scholars is, of course, to offer an economic 
theory of social institutions, such as mores, customs, markets, laws, firms, etc. A social 
institution may generally be understood as a regular pattern of behaviours exercised by 
a group of individuals. For present intents, however, a more informative definition is 
appropriate. A (formal and informal) social institution is a form of knowledge that 
some (institutionalized) group of individuals usually conforms to (even unconsciously) 
in order to carry out purposive action, and that if not conformed to generally leads to 
welfare losses for the group as a whole (inter alia, Schotter, 1981; Rowe, 1989).19 As a 
result, an institution has a double role,  a positive and a negative one. The positive role 
                                                 
16   For instance, there may be a limited role for the central notion of equilibrium if the rationality of actors is 
assessed in terms of knowledge adaptations to contingencies as opposed to the axiomatic optimization 
framework in which all action is considered costless and instantaneous. 
17   The issue is almost reciprocal:  to the best of our knowledge, the only new institutionalist who is aware 
of Lachmann’s institutional contribution is Langlois (1986a, 1992). 
18    Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  For excellent discussions of single and 
multiple-exit modelling, see Langlois (1986b) and Langlois and Csontos (1991). And see O’Driscoll and 
Rizzo (1985; chapter 3) for a discussion in a Lachmannian spirit of whether there can be non-
deterministic situational analysis of economic agents.  
19    Another definition of an institution would also consider ontology:  it would stress the constitutive 
elements and filtering mechanisms that demarcate the nature of an institution as an ensemble of rules 
(which may or may be not known explicitly) in order to more crisply identify its uniqueness in relation 
to other social structures.  For our purposes we need not enter the ontology of institutions, but for an 
elaboration, see Searle (2005) and Lewis and Runde (2006, in press).  
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concerns the ability of an institution to elicit some generally-accepted rule following 
behaviour. The negative role concerns the ability of an institution to punish behaviours 
that contradict generally followed rules. 
  Notice, however, that both roles are essentially complementary, if not in truth 
symbiotic. That is, they both hint to the fact that one distinguishing mark of an 
efficacious social institution is the ability to yield cost savings in conscious ratiocination. 
The double role of institutions aids our limited cognition:  by simplifying social reality 
by means of rule-following and reliability in enforceability of rules, institutions make 
the calculation of expected return to purposive human action much simpler.20 
Lachmann shares two points with such a new institutional view of economics that sees 
an institution as both a behavioural aid and a behavioural constraint. The first is that 
mainstream conceptions of institutions such as firms and markets ignore the positive 
cognitive role that such institutions play, that is, their ability to coordinate different 
expectations through time is downplayed, and all attention is focused on how these 
institutions may align incentives.  Second: simultaneously, the recognized negative role 
of institutions to enforce commitments is often taken as exogenous. To be more specific, 
in mainstream analyses the comparative ability of different types of institutions to have 
different enforceability properties (e.g., respect balanced budgets, limit shirking, etc.) is 
often taken for granted and not studied. This is so because the origin and persistence of 
institutions are not studied.21 Yet Lachmann’s institutional gestalt differs from both the 
mainstream and new institutional approach along one dimension: neither the 
mainstream nor the new institutional approach generally consider the interpretive 
dimension of institutions (Lachmann, 1991: 283). 
  It is precisely such emphasis on “meaning” that represents the other influence on 
– that is, in conjunction to Austrian economics – Lachmann’s institutional perspective. 
The emphasis derives from the Verstehende Sociozologie of Max Weber and Alfred 
Schütz. To consider Lachmann’s stance we need to quickly consider the influence of 
these scholars on Lachmann in reverse order.22 
 
3.1.  Alfred Schütz and the Meaning of Institutions 
By participating in the Mises-Kreis, Schütz was both influenced by and, more 
to the point, influenced Austrian economists. As Prendergast (1986: 11) writes, “… 
marginalism lacked a credible theory of intersubjective understanding; it had no way of 
showing how economic actors knew the motives of other actors, short of assuming 
universal motivation discernible by introspection.  On the other hand, it lacked a viable 
                                                 
20   Langlois (1986a: 175) neatly ties positive and negative roles around the central notion of entropy:  a “social 
institution ... is a mechanism to reduce the entropy of the environment.” 
21    This paper is not the place to expand on this interesting matter, though we will return to it in a 
roundabout way in Section 4 below.  See, for example, Langlois (1986d) and Koppl (1992). 
22   Our order of consideration is in reverse not just because Schütz’s contribution is subsequent to that of 
Weber, but also because Lachmann himself studied Schütz much later than he studied Weber; see 
Koppl (1994: 295-6).  
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theory of concept formation.  ...  Schütz’s genius lay in seeing Weber’s ideal type as a 
solution.”23 
  Now, knowing “the motives of other actors” is evidently knowledge that allows 
you to coordinate your actions with those other actors – but this knowledge of “the 
others” comes in different forms. In fact, Schütz (1972[1932]) develops a whole theory of 
intersubjective understanding. The starting point of his theory is that there is a pre-
given social “life-world” into which we are socialized and which consists of 
typifications:  all “interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous 
experiences of it, our own or those handed down to us by parents or teachers; these 
experiences in the form of ‘knowledge at hand’ function as a scheme of reference.”  The 
“unquestioned pre-experiences are ... at hand as typical, that is, as carrying open 
horizons of anticipated similar experiences” (Schütz, 1962: 7-8). 
  Thus, many typifications are socially constructed. Usually, the more anonymous 
and standardized ideal types are – in terms of laws, regulations, customs, habits, etc. – 
the more distant they are from the individually constructed level. Schütz places such 
conceptualization within a theory of intersubjective understanding that is in turn 
divided into three parts:  the “we-relationship”, the “thou-relationship”, and the “they-
relationship”. The underlying social reality is one of “objective” meaning-contexts that 
are shared by all in society. 
  In the we-relationship, actors are not only aware of each other, but also know 
that this awareness exists. Communication allows them to understand their respective 
meanings, and comprehensively identify each other’s motives.  In the thou-relationship, 
the observer is aware of the actor, but no reciprocal awareness exists.  Here direct 
communication is blocked, so understanding the meanings of the actions of the 
observed party involves more ‘objective’ and more anonymous categories of meaning 
(for example, the meaning contexts within which a postal clerk ‘normally’ operates), but 
not only these.  However, in the most anonymous relationship, the they-relationship, in 
which we try to understand the actions and meanings of anonymous others, we must 
have recourse to ideal types only; specifically to types of the “course-of-action” type or 
the “personal” type. The first type refers to the imputation of certain “typical” motives 
to certain actors (for example, businessmen maximize profits), so that we may deduce 
what will follow with high probability given these motives.  The personal type refers to 
individuals functioning in roles. 
  Thus, typifications bring predictability, and therefore ease action, by ascribing 
meaning to institutions, precisely what Lachmann (1971, 1991) had criticized 
mainstream economics for not allowing. But, as Schütz also points out, acting in the life-
world is not unproblematic, primarily because anticipations are formed in terms of 
typicality. Thus, our expectations are broad and open-ended, waiting to be “filled out” 
as time goes by (cf. also O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985).  Lachmann fills the emptiness of 
                                                 
23   There is a revival of interest, especially in the Austrian circles, in Schütz.  See for example the 2001 issue 
of the Review of Austrian Economics: Special Issue on Alfred Schütz 4(2-3): September, edited by Boettke and 
Koppl.  In an intriguing recent article, Koppl and Whitman (2004) demonstrate that in economics the 
hermeneutic and the rational choice approach are not only perfectly compatible but also complementary.  
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expectations by changing the central element of social scientific investigation from ideal 
type to plan. 
 
3.2.  From Ideal Type to Plan – or, Max Weber Modified 
  Lachmann’s most complete institutional statement is the Legacy of Max Weber 
(1971), a three essay-collection on Weber. And though his statement is inspired by 
Weber, Lachmann explicitly rejects Weber’s notion of ideal type (Idealtypus) in favour of 
the notion of plan.  This is so because “Weber’s ideal type lacks any specific reference to 
human action and seems to be as readily applicable to the animal kingdom or the plant 
world as to the human sphere.”  The notion of plan instead is “germane to human 
action,” for it “constitutes the natural centre of the method of interpretation”; further, 
“most of the other concepts we need in order to give an account of human action and its 
results can be derived from it” (Lachmann, 1971: 29).24 
  Endorsing the method of interpretation through the notion of plan does not at 
the same time mean regressing social science to the period of the Methodenstreit.  Allow 
us to quote from a relevant passage at length. We 
come to the question whether the method of interpretation may be 
employed beyond the borders of history, namely in the analytical 
social sciences.  …  The answer to this question is in the affirmative.  … 
 It is true that in explaining recurrent patterns of action, the essential 
subject-matter of all social sciences, we cannot provide such 
explanation in terms of purposes, as elements of plans, because the 
purposes pursued by millions of people are of course numbered in 
millions.  But often we are none the less able to provide explanations in 
terms of the elements common to all these plans, such as norms, 
institutions, and sometimes institutionalized behaviour, the 
maximization of profits, or the avoidance of the risk of insolvency.  As 
long as we are able to account for the recurrence of patterns of action in 
terms of such elements of plans, we are successfully employing the 
classical method of interpretation.  We are still explaining subsequent 
events in terms of ideas.  Moreover, the line that divides concrete 
historical phenomena from permanent social structures is notoriously 
thin.  …  The plain fact is that every recurrent pattern of events, 
anything we should feel at all entitled to call a ‘structure’, requires 
explanation in terms of permanent forces as well as in terms of 
                                                 
24   In some ways, as Lewis and Runde (2006, in press) also note, if taken literally the emphasis on plan may 
overestimate the importance of behaviour that issues from conscious deliberation.  Tacit knowledge 
may also play an important role in human action.  Relatedly, it may be the case that the notion of plan 
in Lachmann loses the anonimity property that is instead a useful heuristic expedient of the Weberian 
ideal type (see Koppl [1994] and Koppl and Whitman [2004]).  This notwithstanding, our primary objective 
here is to attempt to read Lachmann on his own terms, that is, we are trying to use the interpretative method 
on Lachmann himself:  Lachmann saw himself as trying to bring back in purposeful human agency in a 
discipline that (he saw) was losing it.  
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concrete historical circumstances. Interpretation is needed in the 
former as well as in the latter type of explanation (Op. cit.: 22-3). 
  Referring essentially to modern economies, that is, to economies with a 
sophisticated division of labour, Lachmann moreover argues that the success of any 
plan depends on the actions of other agents.  As such, environmental constraints do not 
only refer to physical and technological constraints, as in, for example, the works of 
David Ricardo, but also to the constraints posed by other purposeful actors each 
pursuing his or her own plan. As a result, institutions – which, exactly as in the new 
institutional tradition, “are at the same time instruments of, and  constraints upon, 
human action” (Op. cit.: 141; original emphasis) – help realize plans by reducing the 
volatility in the plans of other agents.25  In Lachmann’s (very early) words, 
as social scientists ... we are concerned ... [not] ... with ... individual acts 
but mass-phenomena.  Mass-phenomena have to be made intelligible by 
reference to the similarity of the conditions under which different 
individuals have to act.  The conditions the similarity of which makes 
different individuals, who are subject to them, act in an identical manner, 
may be either of a subjective (psychological) or an objective (institutional) 
nature.  ...  Men may act identically, either because they are subject to the 
same mass-psychological influences or because they all have to operate 
within the same institutional framework.  As our knowledge of mass-
psychology is rather scanty compared with our comprehensive cognition 
of institutions and the way they work, it might be useful to lay down as a 
preliminary rule that if ... a mass-psychological and an institutional 
hypothesis come to compete for the role of ‘cause’, preference will be 
given to the latter (Lachmann, 1937: 296).26 
On this conceptualization, Lachmann’s thought exhibits no discontinuity.  And this 
indirectly reinforces our perception that Lachmann was not a nihilist, for continuity in 
thought leaves little room for ambiguity of interpretation.  Consider directly the 
following, later reformulation by Lachmann. 
                                                 
25    Lewin (1999) pursues this Lachmannian theme from the point of view of the capital stock, where 
Lachmann (1978[1956]) also made clear how the inherent capital stock presents us with opportunities 
and with constraints and that we have to take account of both. 
26   In some ways, this passage has a nonAustrian flavour to it, particularly what seems to be a restatement 
of the sociological argument that institutions may somehow be efficient causes of action.  But Lachmann 
has not endorsed (here or elsewhere) Emile Durkheim.  As a result, Lachmann’s point about institutions 
may, as noted, be interpreted differently, namely, to mean that while they do not cause behaviour, they 
influence choice by making available information that would not available in their absence.  In fact, this 
is precisely the reason why Lachmann wrote his book on Weber.  For a realist social theory take on the 
matter, compare Lewis and Runde (2006, in press).  
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An institution provides a means of orientation to a large number of 
actors.  It enables them to coordinate their actions by means of orientation 
to a common signpost.  If the plan is a mental scheme in which the 
conditions of action are coordinated, we may regard institutions, as it 
were, as orientation schemes of the second order, to which planners 
orientate their actions to a plan.  …  The existence of such institutions is 
fundamental to civilized society.  They enable us to rely on the actions of 
thousands of anonymous others about whose individual purposes and 
plans we know nothing.  They are nodal points of society, coordinating 
the actions of millions whom they relieve of the need to acquire and 
digest detailed knowledge about others and form detailed expectations 
about their future action (Lachmann, 1971: 49-50). 
More on this in what follows. 
4.  Meaning, Coordination, and Asynchronous Institutional Evolution 
Institutions “prescribe certain forms of conduct and discourage others.  It is clear that 
those persons who conduct themselves in conformity with them must attribute some 
meaning to them.”  Thus, a “… more satisfactory treatment of institutions in economics 
... will call for the infusion of a sizeable dose of the hermeneutic spirit” (Lachmann 1991: 
282).  This quote synthesises the Lachmannian stance that avoids complete lack of 
predictability and order. That is, it epitomizes what we believe to be the genuine 
Lachmann stance, which is not nihilistic. 
  By not falling into the nihilist trap, Lachmann, in fact, achieves an important 
shift in the the object of analysis. He asserts, as we saw, that the coordination of 
subjective expectations is the problem that economics should primarily focus on.  
But at the same time he is also aware of the fact that if we place subjective 
expectations as such at centre stage, it is possible to fall into an infinite regress 
situation; in different terms, we would be in the presence of a situation where lack of 
order, stability or equilibrium would be normal. In such a situation, the social 
scientist would need to know not only general trends in the consequences of actions, 
but also the minute details attached to the consequences of such actions – not to 
mention all the plans that lead to all actions in the first place.27  But if we think of 
institutions as lighthouses that guide action, then the problem of infinite regress 
                                                 
27   Specifying that Lachmann is borrowing from Sir John R. Hicks, Garrison (1986: 92, footnote omitted) 
reports a nice image.  “Suppose an increase in the supply of fish results in a lower price for fish.   
Expectations that the price of fish will soon return to its previous level will cause demand to increase as 
buyers attempt to take advantage of an opportunity that is perceived to be temporary.  Expectations 
that the price of fish will continue to fall will cause the demand to decrease as buyers wait to take 
advantage of an even better opportunity in the future.  As Lachmann himself often recognizes, it is 
possible to categorize expectations as being either inelastic or elastic with respect to price changes.  
However, it is another matter to predict which will be the case in a particular instance.”  
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disappears, for both we and social actors have an objective point of “orientation”, as 
Lachmann repeatedly says.28 
  It “is clear that … studies … concerned … with human action … require a 
different method of approach to their objects” than those of the natural sciences.  
This method is the “praxeological  method.”  According to such method, human 
“action is not determinate, but neither is it arbitrary”, i.e., completely unpredictable 
and disorderly.  This method 
is bounded, firstly, by the scarcity of the means at the disposal of actors.  
This circumstance imposes a constraint on the freedom of action.  It is 
bounded, secondly, by the circumstance that, while men are free to 
choose ends to pursue, once they have made their choice they must 
adhere to it if consistent action with a chance of success is to be possible at 
all.  In other words, human action is free within an area bounded by 
constraints.  Obstacles of various kinds further limit the area of freedom.  
…  The praxeological method has to take these circumstances into 
account.  Causal explanation in the field of action cannot hope to attain 
determinateness, but this does not mean that we must give up all hope of 
explanation.  …  Orientation thus emerges as a concept as fundamental to 
praxeological study as determinateness is to natural science.  As the latter 
requires a ‘closed’ analytical system, consisting of functions like 
independent and dependent variable as well as constants, to warrant the 
determinate character of its results, so praxeology requires a more flexible 
form of thought, an ‘open’ analytical framework which will nevertheless 
permit us to ascertain the boundaries of action.  Orientation is the pivotal 
concept within this framework (Lachmann, 1971: 37-8; original emphasis). 
It is then only natural that “… there are certain super-individual schemes of thought, 
namely institutions, to which the schemes of thought of the first order, the plans, must 
be oriented, and which serve therefore, to some extent, the coordination of plans.  They 
constitute, we may say, ‘interpersonal orientation tables’, schemes of thought of the 
second order.  To them, praxeology, for which until now the plan and its structure have 
understandably occupied the foreground of interest, will increasingly have to turn in 
time to come” (Lachmann, 1977b[1966]: 62; original emphasis). 
  Institutions, in essence, are structures that facilitate human action:  they assist in 
partially solving the societal coordination problem. So, agents (including social 
scientists) do not have to be able to read each other’s minds to pursue most of their 
actions. They are able to plan and adjust plans in a relatively coordinated way because 
                                                 
28   Compare a more modern statement. “Institutions are … the filter between individuals and the capital 
stock … and between the capital stock and the output of goods and services and the distribution of 
income” (North, 1981: 201; added emphasis).  
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institutions have meaning:  to a large extent, institutions are factually an embodiment of 
the most common plans that, to use a contemporary argot, have become standardized.29 
  But standardization does not take place over night. Personal plans are gradually 
built up and communicated among generations, that is, they take time to become 
institutionalized. As a result, they are not susceptible to fast change.  The “central 
problem of the institutional order hinges on the contrast between coherence and 
flexibility, between the necessarily durable nature of the institutional order as a 
whole and the requisite flexibility of the individual institution.  In other words, this 
central problem does not become apparent until we come to view the institutional 
order in the perspective of time.”  It “is impossible for all institutions to change at 
the same rate … the relative immutability of some institutions is always a necessary 
prerequisite for the relative flexibility of the rest” (Lachmann, 1971: 13-4).   
Lachmann’s theory of institutional evolution requires some elaboration. 
  The Lachmannian institutional view suggests a division of labour among 
”mechanisms” of coordination.  There are two types of mechanisms to coordinate, says 
Lachmann.  On the one hand, we have individual plans, which are more varied and 
volatile.  On the other hand, we have social level institutions that are less varied and 
volatile.  Social level institutions, in turn, can be external and internal (Lachmann 1971: 
81). The external institutions are the scaffolding necessary for the internal institutions to 
work: they include the political regime and property rights.  These external institutions 
are the ones that are relatively immutable and that govern and discipline the relative 
flexibility of internal institutions, such as the firm, the market for wheat and the stock 
exchange.30 
  Moreover, Lachmann claims that the most interesting socioeconomic problems 
arise when external and internal institutions evolve at different rates. Such 
asynchronous evolution creates the need for new individual plans to obviate the 
gaps in social institutions.  Think of responses in the face of an unconstitutional law. 
 (The evolution of social insitutions can also be disrupted by exogenous factors – e.g., 
a natural disaster, such as an earthquake or tsunami, or an uncommon terrorist 
attack, such as 9/11 – that also require the input of individual plans to be 
addressed.) 
  Obviously, the emergence of new individual plans to attempt to bring external 
and internal institutions back into synch can in itself create new institutional gaps that 
need to be solved.  “The businessman, as much as magistrates and judges, must 
presume the Law to be ‘gapless’ (lückenlos was the German word [that Lachmann] liked 
to use), but clearly it was not so and the continual flow of legislation in modern times 
                                                 
29   Standardization can also be interpreted as that part of individual agents’ stocks of knowledge at hand that is 
social in the sense that it consists of shared typifications of the social landscape, that is, as what Schütz, as we 
saw, called “intersubjective structures of meaning.”  It is because agents come equipped with an intimate 
knowledge of their life-world and because much of this knowledge is social rather than private that they are 
able to coordinate their actions. 
30    Compare also Eggertsson’s (1990: Ch. 10) more recent notion of “structural production frontier”: 
essentially an institutional frontier mostly having to do with property rights that co-exists with the more 
familiar technological one.   
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must create problems of compatibility and thus more gaps.  …  Purposeful action is 
oriented towards ‘the rules of the game’ and therefore institutions, while no more 
determining the outcome of social processes than the rules of chess determine the 
outcome of chess games, nevertheless reduce indeterminacy in a Kaleidic society.”   
Since everything changes, Lachmann believed that there is “something to be said in 
each concrete situation” (Mittermaier 1992: 20). 
  It is thanks to the existence of all three coordinative mechanisms (namely, 
individual plans and internal and external social institutions) in every point in time 
that, as society develops, we have at once enablers of and constrains to purposive 
human action. By acting as the tightest of system constraints (Langlois and Koppl, 
1991), the external institutions enable the behaviour at the level of internal institutions 
and plans.  The latter in their turn also act as constraints and enablers, but their task is 
to coordinate that behaviour that, in time, leads to learning and greater division of 
labour in society.  In other words, external institutions make possible the coordination 
of divergent expectations by letting internal institutions and plans interact in a looser 
yet systematic way.  Stabilized by external constraints, in time this type of interaction 
can also lead to the institutionalization of successful plans.  The reason why external 
and internal institutions can evolve at different rates is because they deal with different 
types of knowledge: the task of the internal is mainly to stabilize individual plans, while 
that of the external is to stabilize the internal.  And yet, there is fluidity among the levels 
of coordination, for individual plans and internal and external institutions can all 
influence one another.31  See Figure 1 for a stylized illustration of coordination 
mechanisms in Lachmann, where the different types of dashes stand for both 
permeability and different rates of evolution. 
Figure 1:  Lachmann’s Coordination Mechanisms 
 
                                                 
31   Cf. Langlois (1986a). 
Internal Institutions 
(More volatile, more ”flexible”) 
External Institutions  
(Least volatile, most ”coherent”) 
Heterogenous 
Individual Plans  
(Most volatile, 
most “flexible”)  
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  Lachmann’s economic theory is therefore not a nihilistic socioeconomic dogma.  It 
becomes so only if we detach and render timeless the interaction of individual plans 
from social level institutions, which we claim to be a misinterpretation of Lachmann’s 
message.  Differently put, the perception of Lachmann’s nihilism – to repeat, the fear 
that all action may be rendered rudderless by the failure of expectations to be 
coordinated – could result from the fact that many have tended to (implicitly or 
otherwise) homogenize the knowledge that constitutes the elements of plans and of 
internal and external social institutions.  If we however acknowledge that in 
Lachmann knowledge is a actually structured heterogeneity, we realize that at some 
level expectations are, and must be, coordinated (this is the institutional level) in 
order that at another level they can be – and indeed must be for a dynamic economy 
– disparate (this is the individual plan level).32  It is basically for this reason that we 
suggest to think of social institutions as knowledge capital in Lachmann. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The thesis of this paper is that to recognize Ludwig Lachmann’s work as being in many 
ways idiosyncratic because of its very eclectic and multidisciplinary origin does  not 
simultaneously mean that he was a nihilist.  This thesis yields two lessons of different 
nature. 
  First, from a doctrinal viewpoint, there is the lesson in clarification.  By returning 
to the principal influences at the origin of Lachmannian idiosyncrasy, namely, 
Weberian and Schützian sociology, it clears Lachmann from an accusation of adopting 
an antiscientific stance. To be more precise, to simultaneously assert, as does Lachmann, 
that future knowledge is unpredictable and that no two minds will interpret and 
process information in exactly the same way, does not necessarily mean destroying 
economic theory and, indeed, social science.  Such a “disequilibrium or antiorder 
always” conclusion is a overly hasty one:  it is valid if and only if one does not read 
Lachmann on his own terms.  That is to say that if and only if one reads Lachmann as 
conceptualizing economic interaction in an institutionless world can one coherently 
uphold such a stance.  But such a stance does not do justice to Lachmann’s more 
sophisticated institutional theory. As a matter of fact, such a stance, we show, is 
doctrinally imprecise.  And herein lies our lesson of a second, more substantive,  nature. 
  By trying to read Lachmann on his own theoretical terms, we suggest that his 
socioeconomic thought contains elements of contemporary new institutional theory.   
Lachmann often writes that coordination has two levels: individual (plans) and social 
(e.g., institutions, such as laws, markets, norms, etc.).  The two levels are 
complementary.  The social level recurrent patterns of conduct are instrumental in 
realizing individual plans in that they reduce the volatility in the plans of other agents. 
At the same time, the plans can contribute to change social institutions.  Consequently, 
                                                 
32   Cf. Lewin (1997, 1999).  
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the two coordination levels solve the radical uncertainty problem that Lachmann places 
at centre stage.  Fellow Austrian economist, Friedrich Hayek, agrees with such view.  It 
is ... the views people have formed of each other and of the things, which 
form the true elements of social structure.  If the social structure can 
remain the same although different individuals succeed each other at 
particular points, this is not because the individuals which succeed each 
other are completely identical, but because they succeed each other in 
particular relations, in particular attitudes they take towards other people 
and as the objects of particular view held by other people about them.  
The individuals are merely foci in the network of relationships and it is 
the various attitudes of the individuals toward each other ... which form 
the recurrent, recognizable and familiar elements of the structure (Hayek 
1952: 59). 
So much for points of congruency with contemporary new institutional and Austrian 
theory. 
  Within the second, substantive lesson there also lies a unique Lachmannian 
contribution to institutional reasoning. Lachmann informs us that agents ascertain the 
meaning of social institutions, that is, that they hold (sometimes even unconsciously) an 
understanding about institutions themselves and these understandings of the roles of 
different institutions can be intersubjectively and intertemporally shared. Rational 
individuals understand the role of laws, firms, contracts, and the like. Moreover, most 
individuals are able to understand the ”efficiency” or ”inefficiency” of a particular 
institution (e.g., most workers understand the pliability of their labour market).  If this 
essential hermeneutical twist to institutional analysis were missing, we would, 
according to Lachmann, not be able to fully understand the coordinative role of 
institutions. And such deficiency would be tantamount to believing that human 
purposefulness is, somewhat paradoxically, on a par with that of plant life and 
automata. To Lachmann, in fact, institutions are ultimately knowledge capital. 
  Viewed from a different angle, the reader may at this point question the more 
pragmatic added value of our exercise, for it would seem that we propose a dog-bite-
tail policy stance: we would seem to contradict the policy lessons of comparative 
institutional analysis.  That is to say that our interpretation of Lachmann’s position 
would seem to basically imply that our bounds of cognition in the main increase 
monotonically with an increasing division of knowledge, and that when exceptions to 
this parallel evolution do occur, allocative (axiomatic optimization-and-equilibrium) 
intervention is called for. 
  But if Lachmann did have this in mind, he would not have reverted to the 
Verstehen dimension.  Lack of institutional evolution would not need interpretation, for 
this would imply that all institutions could perform the same function equally well.  
This would contradict Lachmann’s notion of asynchronous institutional evolution.   
Lachmann in fact introduces the notion that there are two types of social institutions – 
external and internal – and specifies that the two types, though interacting, may evolve  
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at different rates.  The asynchronous institutional evolution generates an interesting 
series of socioeconomic issues to be interpreted, investigated, and, when necessary (and 
possible), solved through the input of individual plans. 
  In the abstract, then, the policy implication of a Lachmannian institutional 
approach is not different from that of traditional comparative institutional analysis:  
the social analyst is able to understand the differences in the efficiency properties of 
different viable institutional alternatives.  But in the detail, the difference lies in 
ascribing the ability to understand the value of comparative institutional analysis not 
just to the social analyst, but also to the generalized social actor.  This is the 
sociological contribution of Lachmann to contemporary new institutional economics, 
unbeknown both to him and to most new institutional scholars.  We invite others to 
more explicitly connect this socioeconomic conclusion with sociology proper.33 
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